Борьба Канады за суверенитет в Арктике: история и современность - Дмитрий Анатольевич Володин

Chapter 8. The Mulroney Government and the new concept of sovereignty over Arctic waters. In response to the voyage of the U.S. icebreaker Polar Sea through the NWP in August 1985, the Mulroney government developed and began to implement a new concept of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Its principal difference from the actions of past Canadian governments was the formal declaration of Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. Legally, this was formalized through the drawing of direct baselines around the Arctic Archipelago. An important role in this decision was played by Canadian lawyers, who were able to find numerous arguments to justify the legality of Canada’s use of this method. One of these trump cards was the Inuit factor, i.e. the longstanding occupation and use of the waters of the Arctic Archipelago by the Canadian Inuit. The Mulroney government also succeeded in gaining some support for the Canadian position from the U.S. through the 1988 Canada-U.S. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation under which the U.S. has pledged to seek permission for its icebreakers to pass through Arctic waters claimed by Canada.

Chapter 9. The problem of legal status of the Northwest Passage in the 21st century. A new interest in Canada in the problem of the legal status of the Northwest Passage began with the advent of the 21st century amid expectations that global warming could turn the NWP into an important shipping route. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. were seen by many politicians and experts in Canada as an opportunity to get the US to recognize the NWP as Canadian inland waters. However the Bush Jr. administration has stated that it views the NWP as an international strait. Faced with U.S. refusal to recognize the NWP as Canadian internal waters, the Harper government decided to refocus on expanding Canada’s control of shipping in these waters. The passage of the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long in September 2017 through the Northwest Passage caused a mixed reaction in Canada. On the one hand, the passage of Chinese vessels through the NWP increased the risk of its being recognized as an international strait. On the other hand, it was thought that Chinese money might be needed to finance infrastructure projects in the Canadian Arctic. In the late 2010s, a great concern in Canada was caused by the U.S. Department of Defense’s plans to conduct freedom of navigation operations in the NWP. Fortunately for Canada, these fears did not materialize.

Part III. Struggle for continental shelf, is devoted Canada’s claim to the continental shelf in the Arctic and consists of one chapter.

Chapter 10. Cnada’s claim to the continental shelf in the Arctic. Canada ratified the UNCLOS in 2003 and thus had to submit scientific and technical data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) no later than 2013 to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 miles from the coast. Initially the Canadian submission was to include data for both the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean. However the requirement in 2013 by Canadian Prime Minister S. Harper to include the seabed at the North Pole in the submission forced the Canadian government to split the submission into two parts: in 2013 data on the outer limit of Canada’s continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean were submitted to the CLCS, and in 2019 – on the Arctic. In the 2019 submission Canada claimed a seabed area of 1.2 million square kilometers, including the North Pole. In December 2022 Canada submitted an addendum to its 2019 proposal to the CLCS, in which it further increased its claims to the continental shelf in the Arctic, bringing the boundaries of its shelf to the Russian exclusive economic zone. The increase in the area of disputed areas of the continental shelf between Russia, Canada and Denmark means that the decisive role in establishing the boundaries of the continental shelf of these countries in the Arctic will be played by the corresponding negotiations between these countries. The February 2023 approval by the CLCS of Russian claims to the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha-Mendeleev Rise is important for Canada as well, as it also legitimizes Canada’s right to claim the continental shelf in the Arctic beyond 350 miles from its coast. The extreme aggravation of relations between Russia and the West since 2022 complicates the division of the continental shelf in the Arctic between the countries of this region.

Part IV. Local issues, focuses on narrower and relatively isolated elements of Canada’s sovereignty problem in the Arctic: the border dispute with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and the disagreements between Canada and Denmark in 1970s–2020s over the ownership of Hans Island and the border line between them in the Lincoln Sea.

Chapter 11. Canada-US border dispute in the Beaufort Sea. The dispute between Canada and the United States on the line of demarcation of the water area and the continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea has been ongoing since the mid-1970s. Canada proposes to draw this line along the 141st meridian of the west longitude, and the United States – on the equidistance principle. In the 2000s the subject of the dispute expanded to include also the demarcation of the extended continental shelf of the two countries in the Arctic. Against the backdrop of extremely high oil prices in the late 2000s – mid 2010s attempts by the two countries to resolve this dispute intensified, but the subsequent fall in oil prices reduced the interest of Canada and the United States in resolving this dispute.

Chapter 12. Territorial and border disputes between Canada and Denmark in the Arctic (1970s–2020s). In the 1970s two territorial disputes arose between Canada and Denmark in the Arctic: about the ownership of Hans Island and about the boundary in the Lincoln Sea. In 2005 the two countries agreed to avoid provocative actions in negotiations over Hans Island. In 2012 Canada and Denmark reached